Electrical, Electronic and Electromechanical (EEE) Parts in the New Space Paradigm: When is Better the Enemy of Good Enough?

Kenneth A. LaBel
ken.label@nasa.gov
301-286-9936

Michael J. Sampson
michael.j.sampson@nasa.gov
301-614-6233

Co-Managers, NEPP Program
NASA/GSFC
http://nepp.nasa.gov

Unclassified
## Acronyms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Definition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ADAS</td>
<td>Advanced Driver Assistance System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADC</td>
<td>analog-to-digital converter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AES</td>
<td>Advanced Encryption Standard</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMS</td>
<td>Agile Mixed Signal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARM</td>
<td>ARM Holdings Public Limited Company</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAN</td>
<td>Controller Area Network</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAN-FD</td>
<td>Controller Area Network Flexible Data-Rate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCI/SMMU</td>
<td>Cache Coherent Interconnect System Memory Management Unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Codec</td>
<td>compression/decompression - A codec is an algorithm, or specialized computer program, that reduces the number of bytes consumed by large files and programs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COTS</td>
<td>Commercial off the Shelf</td>
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<tr>
<td>CRC</td>
<td>Cyclic Redundancy Check</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSE</td>
<td>Computer Science and Engineering</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CU</td>
<td>Cu alloy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DCU</td>
<td>Display Controller Unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DDR</td>
<td>Double Data Rate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DMA</td>
<td>Direct Memory Access</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRAM</td>
<td>Dynamic Random Access Memory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DSP</td>
<td>Digital Signal Processing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>dSPI</td>
<td>Dynamic Signal Processing Instrument</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dual Ch</td>
<td>Dual Channel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECC</td>
<td>Error-Correcting Code</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECC</td>
<td>Error-Correcting Code</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EEE</td>
<td>Electrical, Electronic, and Electromechanical</td>
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<tr>
<td>EMAC</td>
<td>Equipment Monitor And Control</td>
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<tr>
<td>eMMC</td>
<td>embedded MultiMediaCard</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>eTimers</td>
<td>Event Timers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FCCU</td>
<td>Fluidized Catalytic Cracking Unit</td>
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<tr>
<td>FinFET</td>
<td>Fin Field Effect Transistor (the conducting channel is wrapped by a thin silicon “fin”)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FlexRay</td>
<td>FlexRay communications bus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G</td>
<td>Gigabit</td>
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<tr>
<td>Gb/s</td>
<td>gigabyte per second</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GIC</td>
<td>Global Industry Classification</td>
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<tr>
<td>GIC</td>
<td>Global Industry Classification</td>
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<tr>
<td>GPU</td>
<td>Graphics Processing Unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GTH</td>
<td>transceivers unique library name</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GTY</td>
<td>transceivers unique library name</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HDIO</td>
<td>High Density Digital Input/Output</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HDR</td>
<td>High-Dynamic-Range</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HPIO</td>
<td>High Performance Input/Output</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I/O</td>
<td>Input/Output Operating System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I2C</td>
<td>Inter-Integrated Circuit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JPEG</td>
<td>Joint Photographic Experts Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KB</td>
<td>Kilobyte</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L2 Cache</td>
<td>independent caches organized as a hierarchy (L1, L2, etc.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LEO</td>
<td>Low Earth Orbit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L-mem</td>
<td>Long-Memory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LPDDR</td>
<td>Low-Power Double Data Rate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M/L BIST</td>
<td>Memory/Logic Built-In Self-Test</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MB</td>
<td>Megabyte</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MIPI</td>
<td>Mobile Industry Processor Interface</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MPSoC</td>
<td>Multi-Processor System on a Chip</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MPU</td>
<td>Micro-Processor Unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAND</td>
<td>non-volatile computer memory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NOR</td>
<td>Not OR logic gate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PC</td>
<td>Personal Computer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PCIe</td>
<td>Peripheral Component Interconnect Express</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PCIe Gen2</td>
<td>Peripheral Component Interconnect Express Generation 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PCIe Gen4</td>
<td>Peripheral Component Interconnect Express Generation 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POF</td>
<td>Physics of Failure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proc.</td>
<td>Processing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PS-GTR</td>
<td>Global Regulation on Pedestrian Safety</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R&amp;D</td>
<td>Research and Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RAM</td>
<td>Random Access Memory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RGB</td>
<td>Red, Green, and Blue</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAR</td>
<td>Successive-Approximation-Register</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SATA</td>
<td>Serial Advanced Technology Attachment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCU</td>
<td>Secondary Control Unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SD</td>
<td>Secure Digital</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SD-HC</td>
<td>Secure Digital High Capacity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SMMU</td>
<td>System Memory Management Unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOC</td>
<td>System on a Chip</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPI</td>
<td>Serial Peripheral Interface</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SwaP</td>
<td>Size, Weight, and Power</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TCM</td>
<td>Tightly Coupled Memory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Temp</td>
<td>Temperature</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T-Sensor</td>
<td>Temperature-Sensor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UART</td>
<td>Universal Asynchronous Receiver/Transmitter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USB</td>
<td>Universal Serial Bus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WDT</td>
<td>Watchdog Timer</td>
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</table>
Abstract

- As the space business rapidly evolves to accommodate a lower cost model of development and operation via concepts such as commercial space and small spacecraft (aka, CubeSats), traditional EEE parts screening and qualification methods are being scrutinized under a risk-reward trade space. In this presentation, two basic concepts will be discussed:
  - The movement from complete risk aversion EEE parts methods to managing and/or accepting risk via alternate approaches; and,
  - A discussion of “over-design” focusing on both electrical design performance and bounding margins.
- Example scenarios will be described as well as consideration for trading traditional versus alternate methods.
Outline

• The Changing Space Market
  – Commercial Space and “Small” Space
• EEE Parts Assurance
• Modern Electronics
  – Magpie Syndrome
• Breaking Tradition: Alternate Approaches
  – Higher Assembly Level Tests
  – Use of Fault Tolerance
• Mission Risk and EEE Parts
• Summary

Hubble Space Telescope courtesy NASA
Space Missions: How Our Frontiers Have Changed

- Cost constraints and cost “effectiveness” have led to dramatic shifts away from traditional large-scale missions (ex., Hubble Space Telescope).

- Two prime trends have surfaced:
  - Commercial space ventures where the procuring agent “buys” a service or data product and the implementer is responsible for ensuring mission success with limited agent oversight. And,
  - Small missions such as CubeSats that are allowed to take higher risks based on mission purpose and cost.

- These trends are driving the usage of non Mil/Aero parts such as Automotive grade (see Mike Sampson’s talk) and “architectural reliability” approaches.
Number of CubeSats On-Orbit

To be presented by Kenneth A. LaBel at ESCCON 2016 European Space Components Coordination Conference (ESCON), March 1-3, 2016, Noordwijk, Netherlands.
EEE Parts Assurance
Assurance for EEE Parts

- **Assurance is**
  - Knowledge of
    - The supply chain and manufacturer of the product,
    - The manufacturing process and its controls, and,
    - The physics of failure (POF) related to the technology.
  - Statistical process and inspection via
    - Testing, inspection, physical analyses and modeling.
  - Understanding the application and environmental conditions for device usage.
    - This includes:
      - Radiation,
      - Lifetime,
      - Temperature,
      - Vacuum, etc., as well as,
      - Device application and appropriate derating criteria.
Reliability and Availability

- **Reliability (Wikipedia)**
  - The ability of a system or component to perform its required functions under stated conditions for a specified period of time.
    - Will it work for as long as you need?

- **Availability (Wikipedia)**
  - The degree to which a system, subsystem, or equipment is in a specified operable and committable state at the start of a mission, when the mission is called for at an unknown, i.e., a random, time. Simply put, availability is the proportion of time a system is in a functioning condition. This is often described as a mission capable rate.
    - Will it be available when you need it to work?

- **Combining the two drives mission requirements:**
  - *Will it work for as long as and when you need it to?*
What does this mean for EEE parts?

• The more understanding you have of a device’s failure modes and causes, the higher the confidence level that it will perform under mission environments and lifetime
  - **High confidence** = “it has to work”
    • High confidence in both reliability and availability.
  - **Less confidence** = “it may to work”
    • Less confidence in both reliability and availability.
    • It may work, but prior to flight there is less certainty.
Traditional Approach to Confidence

• **Part level qualification**
  – Qualification processes are designed to statistically understand/remove known reliability risks and uncover other unknown risks inherent in a part.
    • Requires significant sample size and comprehensive suite of piecepart testing (insight) – *high confidence method*

• **Part level screening**
  – Electronic component screening uses environmental stressing and electrical testing to identify marginal and defective components within a procured lot of EEE parts.
However, tradition doesn’t match the changing space market and alternate EEE parts approaches that may be “good enough” are being used. 

*(Discussed later in presentation.*)
Modern Electronics
The Magpie Syndrome:  
*The Electrical Designer’s Dilemma*

- Magpie’s are known for being attracted to bright, shiny things.
- In many ways, the modern electrical engineer is a Magpie:
  - They are attracted to the latest state-of-the-art devices and EEE parts technologies.
    - These can be any grade of EEE parts that aren’t qualified for space nor radiation hardened.
  - These bright and shiny parts may have very attractive performance features that aren’t available in higher-reliability parts:
    - Size, weight, and power (SwaP),
    - Integrated functionality,
    - Speed of data collection/transfer,
    - Processing capability, etc…
Example Magpie EEE Parts

S32V234 Block Diagram

Advanced Driver Assistance System (ADAS)
Sensor Fusion Processor
Freescale.com

Xilinx Zynq UltraScale+
Multi-Processor System on a Chip (MPSoC) -
16nm CMOS with Vertical FinFETS
Xilinx.com

To be presented by Kenneth A. LaBel at ESCCON 2016 European Space Components Coordination Conference (ESCCON), March 1-3, 2016, Noordwijk, Netherlands.
Gartner Hype Cycle –
*Reality of Shiny New Things*

http://www.gartner.com

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When Should a Magpie Fly?

- While not designed for usage in the harsh environs of space, there are still multiple scenarios where usage of Magpies may be considered:
  - Mil/Aero alternatives are not available,
    - Ex., SWaP or functionality or procurement schedule,
  - A mission has a relatively short lifetime or benign space environment exposure,
    - Ex., 6 month CubeSat mission in LEO,
  - A system can assume possible unknown risks,
    - Ex., technology demonstration mission,
  - Device upscreening (per mission requirements) and system validation are performed to obtain confidence in usage,
  - System level assurances based on fault tolerance and higher assembly level test and validation are deemed sufficient.
    - This is a systems engineering trade that takes a multi-disciplinary review.
  - Or maybe as a pathfinder for future usage.
    - Out of scope for this talk: use of flight data for “qualification”.

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Magpie Constraints

• But Magpies aren’t designed for space flight (just some aviary aviation at best)!

• Sample differences include:
  – Temperature ranges,
  – Vacuum performance,
  – Shock and vibration,
  – Lifetime, and
  – Radiation tolerance.

• Traditionally, “upscreening” at the part level has occurred.
  – Definition: A means of assessing a portion of the inherent reliability of a device via test and analysis.
    • Note: Discovery of a upscreened part failure occurs regularly.

• The following charts discuss alternate approaches.
Breaking Tradition: Alternate Approaches
Assembly Testing:
Can it Replace Testing at the Parts Level?

We can test devices, but how do we test systems?
Or better yet, systems of systems on a chip (SOC)?
Not All Assemblies are Equal

• Consider assemblies having two distinct categories
  – Off the shelf (you get what you get) such as COTS, and,
  – Custom (possibility of having “design for test” included”)  
    • Still won’t be as complete as single part level testing, but it does reduce some challenges.

• For COTS assemblies, some of the specific concerns are:
  – Bill-of-materials may not include lot date codes or device manufacturer information.
  – Individual part application may not be known or datasheet unavailable.
  – The possible variances for “copies” of the “same” assembly:
    • Form, fit, and function EEE parts may mean various manufacturers, or,
    • Lot-to-lot and even device-to-device differences in reliability/availability.
Sample Challenges for Testing Assemblies

- Limited statistics versus part level approaches due to sample size.
- Inspection constraints.
- Acceleration factors
  - Temperature testing limited to “weakest” part.
  - Voltage testing may be limited by on-board/on-chip power regulation.
- Limited test points and I/O challenge adequate stress data capture.
- Ensuring adequate fault coverage testing.
- Visibility of errors/failures/faults due to limited I/O availability.
- System operation.
  - Ex., Using nominal flight software versus a high stress test approach.
- Error propagation
  - An error occurs but does not propagate outward until some time later due to system operations such as those of an interrupt register.
- Fault masking during radiation exposure
  - Too high a particle rate or too many devices being exposed simultaneously.
Using Fault Tolerance

• Making a system more “reliable/available” can occur at many levels
  – Operational
    • Ex., no operation in the South Atlantic Anomaly (proton hazard)
  – System
    • Ex., redundant boxes/busses or swarms of nanosats
  – Circuit/software
    • Ex., error detection and correction (EDAC) scrubbing of memory devices by an external device or processor
  – Device (part)
    • Ex., triple-modular redundancy (TMR) of internal logic within the device
  – Transistor
    • Ex., use of annular transistors for TID improvement
  – Material
    • Ex., addition of an epi substrate to reduce SEE charge collection (or other substrate engineering)

Good engineers can invent infinite solutions, but the solution used must be adequately validated.
Example:
Is Radiation Testing Always Required for COTS?

- Exceptions for testing may include
  - Operational
    - Ex., The device is only powered on once per orbit and the sensitive time window for a single event effect is minimal
  - Acceptable data loss
    - Ex., System level error rate (availability) may be set such that data is gathered 95% of the time.
      - Given physical device volume and assuming every ion causes an upset, this worst-case rate may be tractable.
  - Negligible effect
    - Ex., A 2 week mission on a shuttle may have a very low Total Ionizing Dose (TID) requirement.

Memory picture courtesy NASA/GSFC, Code 561

A flash memory may be acceptable without testing if a low TID requirement exists or not powered on for the large majority of time.
Is knowledge of EEE Parts Failure Modes Required To Build a Fault Tolerant System?

- The system *may* work, but do we have adequate confidence in the system to have adequate reliability and availability prior to launch?
  - What are the “unknown unknowns”?
    - Can we account for them?
  - How do you calculate risk with unscreened/untested EEE parts?
  - Do you have a common mode failure potential in your design?
    - I.e., a design with identical redundant strings rather than having independent redundant strings.
  - How do you adequately validate a fault tolerant system for space?
    - *This is a critical point.*
Bottom Line on Assembly Testing and Fault Tolerance

- While clearly ANY testing is better than none, assembly testing has limitations compared to the individual EEE part level.
  - This is a risk-trade that’s still to be understood.
  - No *definitive* study exists comparing this approach versus traditional parts qualification and screening.

- Fault tolerance needs to be validated.
  - Understanding the fault and failure signatures is required to design appropriate tolerance.
  - The more complex the system, the harder the validation is.
Mission Risk and EEE Parts
Understanding Risk

- The risk management requirements may be broken into three considerations
    - Relate to the circuit designs not being able to meet mission criteria such as jitter related to a long dwell time of a telescope on an object
  - Programmatic – “The Bad”
    - Relate to a mission missing a launch window or exceeding a budgetary cost cap which can lead to mission cancellation
  - Radiation/Reliability – “The Ugly”
    - Relate to mission meeting its lifetime and performance goals without premature failures or unexpected anomalies
- Each mission must determine its priorities among the three risk types
Background: Traditional Risk Matrix

Risk Tolerance Boundary
Placed on the profile to reflect Corporate “Risk Appetite”

By adjusting the level of currency hedging, resources can be released to help fund improvements to protection of the production facility.

Caution Zone
Risks in the “yellow” area need constant vigilance and regular audit

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Likelihood Scale</th>
<th>A: Very High</th>
<th>B: High</th>
<th>C: Occasional</th>
<th>D: Low</th>
<th>E: Very Low</th>
<th>F: Almost Impossible</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Impact Scale</td>
<td>I: Catastrophic</td>
<td>II: Critical</td>
<td>III: Significant</td>
<td>IV: Marginal</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Space Missions: EEE Parts and Risk

• The determination of acceptability for device usage is a complex trade space.
  – Every engineer will “solve” a problem differently:
    • Ex., software versus hardware solutions.

• The following chart proposes an alternate mission risk matrix approach for EEE parts based on:
  – Environment exposure,
  – Mission lifetime, and,
  – Criticality of implemented function.

• Notes:
  – “COTS” implies any grade that is not space qualified and radiation hardened.
  – Level 1 and 2 refer to traditional space qualified EEE parts.
### Notional EEE Parts Selection Factors

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Criticality</th>
<th>Level 1 or 2, rad hard suggested. Full upscreening for COTS. Fault tolerant designs for COTS.</th>
<th>Level 1 or 2 suggested. COTS upscreening/testing recommended. Fault tolerant designs for COTS.</th>
<th>Level 1 or 2, rad hard suggested. Full upscreening for COTS. Fault tolerant designs for COTS.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>COTS upscreening/testing recommended. Fault-tolerance suggested</td>
<td>COTS upscreening/testing recommended. Fault-tolerance recommended</td>
<td>COTS upscreening/testing recommended. Fault-tolerance recommended</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>COTS upscreening/testing recommended. Fault-tolerance suggested</td>
<td>COTS upscreening/testing recommended. Fault-tolerance recommended</td>
<td>COTS upscreening/testing recommended. Fault-tolerance recommended</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>COTS upscreening/testing optional. Do no harm (to others)</td>
<td>COTS upscreening/testing recommended. Fault-tolerance suggested. Do no harm (to others)</td>
<td>Rad hard suggested. COTS upscreening/testing recommended. Fault tolerance recommended</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Environment/Lifetime**

- Low
- Medium
- High

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A Few Details on the “Matrix”

- When to test:
  - “Optional”
    - Implies that you might get away without this, but there’s residual risk.
  - “Suggested”
    - Implies that it is good idea to do this, and likely some risk if you don’t.
  - “Recommended”
    - Implies that this really should be done or you’ll definitely have some risk.
  - Where just the item is listed (like “full upscreening for COTS”)
    - This should be done to meet the criticality and environment/lifetime concerns.

- The higher the level of risk acceptance by a mission, the higher the consideration for performing alternate assembly level testing versus traditional part level.
- All fault tolerance must be validated.

*Good mission planning identifies where on the matrix a EEE part lies.*
Summary

• In this talk, we have presented:
  – An overview of considerations for alternate EEE parts approaches:
    • Technical, programmatic, and risk-oriented
      – Every mission views the relative priorities differently.
  – As seen below, every decision type may have a process.
    – It’s all in developing an appropriate one for your application and avoiding “buyer’s remorse”!

Five stages of Consumer Behavior
http://www-rohan.sdsu.edu/~renglish/370/notes/chapt05/